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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Free appeals from the district court's order denying his oral LC.R. 35 
motion for reduction of sentence. Free also challenges the Idaho Supreme 
Court's order denying his motion to augment the appellate record. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
During an argument, Free battered his girlfriend, Stephanie Burkett. (PSI, 
pp.2-4.) Free grabbed Burkett by the hair, threw her down, and stomped on the 
side of her face. (PSI, p.2.) Free then grabbed Burkett's neck and held her on 
the ground, which prevented Burkett from breathing or screaming. (Id.) When 
Free finally let go, Burkett screamed for help, and their roommate intervened and 
pulled Free off Burkett. (Id.) Free left the residence. (Id.) Approximately 45 
minutes later, Free returned, told Burkett she needed to leave, and held her 
down and punched her in the face. (Id.) He also forced her head into a pillow, 
which prevented her from breathing. (Id.) Their roommate again intervened and 
pulled Free away. (Id.) 
Officers responded to the scene and observed wounds to Burkett's face, 
neck, and arms. (Id.) The officers specifically observed red scratches and 
abrasions to the front of Burkett's neck. (PSI, p.19.) Paramedics transported 
Burkett to St. Alphonsus Hospital. (Id.) Free was taken into custody. (PSI, 
p.23.) 
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enforcement officers investigated the incident and interviewed 
Burkett, their roommate. (PSI, pp.2-4, 18-40.) Free asserted that Burkett 
initiated the physical confrontation by coming him with a meat cleaver, though 
the interviewing officer noticed that Free did not have any defensive wounds. 
(PSI, pp.23-25.) Burkett acknowledged that she grabbed a knife during the 
confrontation, but stated she did so only after Free had first knocked her to the 
floor and punched and kicked her head. (PSI, pp.37-38.) 
The state filed a complaint charging Free with attempted strangulation, 
and the district court entered a no-contact order with Burkett. (R., pp.10-11, 16.) 
Before the preliminary hearing, Free made several phone calls to Burkett from jail 
in violation of the no-contact order. (PSI, pp.60-62.) In these phone calls, Free 
pressured Burkett not to press charges against him, and to tell the investigating 
officers that she strangled herself. (Id.) Free also told Burkett that he was 
coming to see her even if there was a no-contact order still in place. (PSI., p.61.) 
The state amended their complaint and charged Free with attempted 
strangulation, felony domestic battery, and felony intimidation of a witness. (R., 
pp.52-54.) Pursuant to plea agreement, Free pied guilty to attempted 
strangulation, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., p.113; Tr., 
p.6, L.6 - p.27, L.10.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years 
with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Free on probation 
for 10 years. (R., pp.113-118.) The district court also ordered Free to report to 
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the Ada County Jail within 48 hours to serve 120 days, and to pay $3,114.21 in 
restitution to Burkett's medical providers. (R., pp.111-118.) 
Free did not report to jail as required and instead soon moved back in with 
Burkett. (R., p.136; PSI, p.76.) Less than two months after being sentenced for 
attempted strangulation, Free battered Burkett again during another physical 
confrontation. (PSI, p.90.) Free was charged with misdemeanor domestic 
battery and violation of a no-contact order. (R., p.126.) The state also filed a 
motion for probation violation. (R., pp.135-137.) In the new case, Free ultimately 
pied guilty to violating the no-contact order and an amended charge of disturbing 
the peace. (PSI, p.74.) Free admitted that he violated his probation by 
committing these new crimes. (R., p.150.) The district court revoked Free's 
probation but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.152-154.) 
At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
placed Free back on probation. (R., pp.164-169.) Approximately 18 months 
later, the state filed a second motion for probation violation, alleging Free violated 
his probation by failing to attend and/or successfully complete required domestic 
violence and cognitive self-change treatment, failing to pay restitution, failing to 
maintain or seek employment, consuming alcohol, failing to obtain his GED or 
HSE as ordered, failing to truthfully answer questions of his probation officer with 
regard to the criminal probation status of his new girlfriend, committing a new 
misdemeanor battery, failing to notify his probation officer of his contact with law 
enforcement, using marijuana, and engaging in an unauthorized romantic 
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relationship. (R., pp.186-189.) Free admitted to consuming alcohol, using 
marijuana, and engaging in the unauthorized relationship. (Tr., p.49, L.4 - p.50, 
L.17.) 
During his disposition hearing, Free made an oral !.C.R. 35 motion to 
reduce his sentence by half. (Tr., p.55, L.8 - p.57, L.18.) The district court 
denied the motion, revoked Free's probation, and ordered his original sentence 
executed. (R., pp.199-201; Tr., p.62, Ls.18-23.) Free timely appealed. (R., 
pp.202-204.) 
After the appellate record was settled, Free made a motion to augment the 
record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of the admission and disposition 
hearings from his first probation violation proceedings in 2009, an as-yet 
unprepared transcript of his jurisdictional review hearing from 2010, and an 
addendum to the pre-sentence investigation which contained the IDOC's 
jurisdictional review report. (7/9/12 Motion.) The state objected with regard to 
the requested transcripts. (7/11/12 Objection.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
granted Free's motion to augment the record with the PSI addendum, but denied 
the motion with regard to the requested transcripts. (7/27/12 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Free states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Free due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Free's oral Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, in light of the 
mitigating factors present in this matter? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record? 
2. Has Free failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his oral I.C.R. 35 motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals, That Court Lacks The 
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision To Deny Free's 
Motion To Augment The Record; Alternatively, Free Has Failed To Establish Any 
Constitutional Violation Resulting From The Denial Of His Motion To Augment 
A. Introduction 
Free contends that by denying his motion to augment the appellate record 
with as-yet unprepared transcripts of hearings associated with his 2009 probation 
violation and 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, the Idaho Supreme Court 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has 
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-
17.) Should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, however, that 
Court lacks the authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny 
Free's motion. Further, even if the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Free's 
motion is reviewed on appeal, Free has failed to establish a violation of his 
constitutional rights. 
B. The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be Assigned This Case, Lacks The 
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision 
Recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, 
and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made 
prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that 
the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or 
other law." State v. Morgan, 2012 WL 2782599 * 2 (Ct. App. 2012), petition for 
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review pending. Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be 
tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court.'' kl 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals did leave open the possibility of 
review of such motions in some circumstances. kl Such circumstances may 
occur, the Court indicated, where "the completed briefs have refined, clarified, or 
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for 
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support 
a renewed motion.'' kl 
In the present case, however, the briefing has not demonstrated the need 
for additional transcripts in the appellate record, and Free has not provided new 
evidence to support any renewed motion. Free's argument in his Appellant's 
Brief as to why the record should be augmented with transcripts at issue 
constitute the same arguments he presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in his 
motion - that the district court may have relied on statements or evidence from 
those hearings in making its subsequent sentencing decisions. (Compare 7/9/12 
Motion with Appellant's brief, pp.5-17.) Because the Idaho Court of Appeals 
19cks the authority to review, and in effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and because Free has failed to provide any new evidence or 
clarification in his Appellant's Brief that would permit the Idaho Court of Appeals 
to do so, the Idaho Court of Appeals must decline, if it is assigned this case, to 
review the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Free's motion to augment the record. 
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C. Even If The Merits Of Free's Argument Are Reviewed On Appeal, Free 
Has Failed To Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His Constitutional 
Rights 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Free's constitutional 
claims, all of his arguments fail. As in Morgan, Free argues that he is entitled to 
the additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a 
violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-17.) All of 
Free's arguments lack merit. 
"A defendant in a criminal case only has a due process right to a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." Morgan at *2 (citing cases, internal quotations 
omitted). To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must 
show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the 
appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) 
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)); see also 
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice, Free 
"must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were 
requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6 th Cir. 2002). Free 
has failed to carry this burden. 
On appeal, Free challenges only the district court's decision to deny his 
oral I.C.R. 35 motion. (See generally Appellant's brief.) The transcript of the 
probation disposition hearing at which Free's probation was revoked, and at 
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which his oral I.C.R. 35 motion was made and denied, is in the appellate record. 
(Tr., p.52, L.4 - p.62, L.23.) Also contained in the appellate record are 
transcripts from Free's guilty plea and sentencing hearings, and the transcript 
from the admission hearing associated with Free's second probation violation. 
(See generally Tr.) Further, information cited by the district court in reaching its 
sentencing and I.C.R. 35 motion decisions at issue in this case, including Free's 
criminal history and his performance on probation, is contained in the PSI, which 
is included in the record. (See generally PSI.) 
Free nevertheless contends this available information is inadequate for 
appellate review of his claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-17.) He asserts that in the .. 
absence of his requested transcripts, his claims "will not be addressed on their 
actual merits," because, he argues, a district court "may rely upon the information 
it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made its 
sentencing determinations," and that this reliance may only be evaluated by 
reviewing transcripts from each and every hearing from his case. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.11-12.) This argument, however, relies on mere gross speculation that 
the district court "may" have considered information that was presented 
exclusively at the hearings in 2009 and 2010. If Free thought there was specific 
information critical to the district court's consideration of his I.C.R. 35 motion in n 
the transcripts he now seeks, he should have presented that information to the 
court with his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
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The state recognizes that in State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 
P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that, in reviewing a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, the Court 
"will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 
judgment" and review is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the 
revocation of probation." However, this language from Hanlngton does not 
require augmentation with transcripts of all hearings from the original sentencing 
to the final probation revocation and imposition of sentence. As explained in 
Morgan, such an interpretation of Hanington is too broad. Morgan at *3. The 
Court of Appeals clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine [itself] to only 
those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the revocation of probation 
... that does not mean that a// proceedings in the trial court up to and including 
sentencing are germane." kl (emphasis original). Rather, "[t]he focus of the 
inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation." 
kl Accordingly, the Court "will consider the elements of the record before the 
trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made 
part of the record on appeal." kl Because all relevant information to the district 
court's decision to deny Free's oral l.C.R. 35 motion is already included in the 
record on appeal, Free has failed to show any due process violation resulting 
from the Supreme Court's orders denying his motion to augment the record with 
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transcripts associated with his 2009 probation violating proceedings and 2010 
jurisdictional review hearing. 
Free's equal protection argument also lacks merit. The Court in Morgan 
rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of all 
transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. 
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the 
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for 
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the 
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions 
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's 
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his 
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to 
augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's 
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, 
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
Morgan at *4. Free's equal protection claim fails for the same reasons. 
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a 
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective 
assistance of counsel. Morgan at *4. Free, like Morgan, "has failed to 
demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not possible without the 
requested transcripts." lg_,_ 
All of Free's claims relating to the denial of his motions to augment the 
record fail. 
11 
11. 
Free Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denving His 
!.C.R. 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Free next asserts that the district abused its discretion when it 
denied his oral LC.R. 35 motion during the hearing at which it ultimately revoked 
his probation and ordered its original sentence executed. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.18-20.) Because has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, this 
Court must affirm the district court's determination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying 
Free's Oral I.C.R. 35 Motion 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7 (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 
324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 
977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a 
sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established 
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. Haninaton, 148 Idaho at 
28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under 
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any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the 
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 
P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine 
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment," 
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 
148 Idaho at 29,218 P.3d at 8. 
In this case, Free made an oral I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his 
sentence at his second probation violation disposition hearing. (Tr., p.55, L.10 -
p.57, L.18.) Free requested revocation of his probation and imposition of a 
reduced sentence so that he could "just be done with it." (Tr., p.55, Ls.10-14.) 
Free promised the court that if it reduced his sentence he would leave the state 
upon release and that the court would never see him again. (Tr., p.57, Ls.15-18.) 
Free has failed to meet his burden of showing either that the district court abused 
its discretion in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion, or that his sentence was excessive 
in light of the facts existing at the time the sentence was imposed, and the events 
that occurred during Free's unsuccessful attempts at community supervision. 
Free's attacks in the underlying case resulted in visible and significant 
injuries to Burkett. (PSI, pp.19, 41-59.) After he was taken into custody, Free 
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demonstrated his continuing danger to Burkett and the community at-large 
through his repeated attempts to contact Burkett and pressure her to help him in 
the criminal proceeding despite the presence of a no-contact ordei (PSI, pp.60-
62.) 
Free also has a significant criminal history. Prior to the underlying 
offense, Free had at least one prior felony conviction, which resulted in a Nevada 
prison sentence. 1 (PS!, p.6; Tr., p.36, Ls.23-24.) He also had a felony drug 
charge which resulted in a deferred judgment and treatment program referral. 
(PSI, p.5.) In addition, Free has prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic 
battery, conspiracy to utter a forged instrument, driving under the influence, and 
obstructing police officers. (PSI, pp.5-6.) Free's criminal history only became 
more significant after he was placed on probation in the present case. While on 
probation for attempted strangulation, Free was charged again with 
misdemeanor domestic battery and violation of a no-contact order after an 
incident involving the same victim. (PSI, p.90; R., p.136.) He ultimately pied 
guilty to an amended charge of disturbing the peace and violation of a no-contact 
order. (PSI, p.74.) By the time his probation was revoked for the second time, 
Fiee had also been charged with a new misdemeanor battery offense involving 
his new girlfriend's father. (R., p.188; Tr., p.53, Ls.1-5.) 
1 In the Nevada felony case, Free was charged with uttering a forged instrument, 
burglary, possession of a forged instrument, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (PSI, p.6.) However, it is unclear from the. PSI which of these 
charges resulted in the conviction for which he served prison'time. (Id.) 
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The new crimes were only part of Free's exceedingly poor performance on 
probation. Free's initial probation officer reported that showed "a consistent 
pattern of disregard for the rules of society as well as a flagrant disregard for the 
court order." (PSI, p.88.) Prior to the first report of probation violation, Free "had 
not made efforts to begin treatment, begin his work release requirements, nor 
stay in contact with his Probation Officer." (Id.) After the district court granted 
Free a second opportunity for probation upon the conclusion of the retained 
jurisdiction program, Free continued to demonstrate a total inability to comply 
with the requirements of community supervision. Most notably, Free's probation 
officer reported that he failed to complete treatment, used alcohol and marijuana, 
and engaged in an unauthorized romantic relationship with a woman who was 
herself on felony supervised probation. (R., pp.186-189.) 
On appeal, Free cites mitigating factors including his substance abuse, 
unstable childhood, and his girlfriend's violence towards him during the 
underlying domestic violence incident. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) However, 
the district court expressly considered these and other mitigating factors in 
making its sentencing determinations. At the original sentencing hearing, the 
district court noted that it was not initially inclined to grant Free the opportunity for 
probation. (Tr., p.41, Ls.10-17.) However, the court explained that such an 
opportunity was warranted in light of Free's recent ability to hold a regular job 
and his apparent success in addressing his drug problem. (Tr., p.41, L.18 -
p.42, L.20.) The court also acknowledged the mutually violent relationship 
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between Free and Burkett, but stated that this relationship volatility made the no-
contact order - that Free repeatedly violated - particularly important to the safety 
of both parties. (Tr., p.43, L.1 - p.44. L.4.) 
In light of the seriousness of the crime, Free's criminal history, and his 
repeated failure to demonstrate his amenability to rehabilitation, the district 
court's denial of Free's oral I.C.R. 35 motion and refusal to reward Free with a 
shorter sentence was entirely reasonable. Free has fail?d to establish an abuse 
of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying his l.C.R. 35 motion. 
DATED this 7th day of November 2012. 
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MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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